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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The issues on appeal are whether Petitioner's support
obligation is res judicata when her Divorce Decree specifies
that her former husband must pay child support to her, but does
not obligate her to pay support to him; whether an increased
support order may be imposed retroactively on a divorced parent
who has legal custody of a child but not physical custody; and
whether changes in court-ordered support obligations may be
made in administrative proceedings.
STATEMENT OF CASE
This is an appeal from a final order of the Third Judicial
District Court on Petitioner's Petition for Review from the
Findings and Order of the Department of Social Services Administrative Court for the State of Utah.

The Order, dated

November 23, 1983, required the Petitioner/Appellant, Marsha
Lee Starks Beachler, to reimburse^the Department of Social
Services (the Department) for child support arrearages in the
amount of $125.00, and further ordered her to pay $25.00 per
month as ongoing child support to the Department as long as
public assistance was provided for the minor child, Diana, to
Petitioner's ex-husband, Mr. Hutchinson. (R. 36). The Third
Judicial District Court, in a Memorandum Decision dated June
19, 1986, affirmed the Findings and Order of the Administrative
Law Judge.

(R. 82).
STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Petitioner and John C. Hutchinson, had two children as
issue to their marriage:

Diana Michele Hutchinson and John
_ i .

Collins Hutchinson, Jr.

The Third Judicial District Court of

Salt Lake County, State of Utah entered a Decree of Divorce on
June 15, 1972. The decree awarded custody of the minor children to the Petitioner, and ordered Mr. Hutchinson to pay child
support to the Petitioner in the amount of Sixty Dollars
($60.00) per month per child.

(R.34-35).

The Decree does not

obligate the Petitioner to pay any child support to Mr.
Hutchinson.

The decree was never judicially modified on the

issues of child support or child custody.
In or about October, 1982, the Petitioner and Mr.
Hutchinson agreed that the minor child, Diana, would begin
residing with Mr. Hutchinson.

Approximately two months later,

the Petitioner and Mr. Hutchinson agreed that John Jr. would
also reside with Mr. Hutchinson.

John Jr. lived with Mr.

Hutchinson until May, 1983, when he returned to reside with
Petitioner.

(R.26, 27).

Mr. Hutchinson applied for and received public assistance
for the two children during June and July, 1983, and from
August 1983, for an undetermined amount of time for the minor
child, Diana. (R.22).

Subsequently, the Office of Recovery

Services assessed child support arrearages against the Petitioner.

After an administrative hearing before the Department

of Social Services Administrative Court, the Administrative Law
Judge found Petitioner legally obligated, pursuant to the
Public Support of Children Act, Utah Code Ann., 1953, §78-45b-l
to 24 (Supp. 1985) (the Act), to reimburse the Department for
funds it had advanced to Petitioner's former husband for the
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support of their children in the amount of $125.00 for child
support arrearages, and $25.00 per month for ongoing child
support.

(R.36).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Utah Law provides that the District Courts retain jurisdiction to modify child support orders of Divorce Decrees.
Until a Decree is properly modified, any issues already addressed are res judicata as to the rights and obligations of
the parties.

The State Department of Social Services may not

modify an existing support order through an administrative
proceeding.

The Department of Social Services has the authori-

ty to collect unpaid support debts that accrue under existing
court orders, and in some instances where no order exists.
This authority to collect child support does not include the
right to administratively redetermine a party's support obligation when a prior court order has already allocated the obligation.

When a judicial modification of an existing support

obligation is proper, prior case law in this jurisdiction has
held that only^prospective and not retroactive modification is
permissible.
ARGUMENT
I. WHERE PETITIONER'S DIVORCE DECREE
SPECIFIES THAT HER FORMER SPOUSE MUST PAY
CHILD SUPPORT TO HER BUT DOES NOT OBLIGATE HER
TO PAY SUPPORT TO HIM, THE MATTER IS RES JUDICATA
AS TO THE ISSUE OF PETITIONER'S CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION.
The Petitioner's Divorce Decree does not order her to pay
any child support to Mr. Hutchinson.

A valid court order

exists setting forth support obligations regarding Petitioner's
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children.

Though either party could have sought a modification

of that order when physical custody of the children changed,
neither attempted to modify the decree.

Mr. Hutchinson is the

sole party ordered to pay child support under the Divorce
Decree.
The rights of the Department are derivative and no greater
than the rights of Mr. Hutchinson.
(Supp. 1985).

U.C.A., 1953 §78-45b-3

The Divorce Decree does not give Mr. Hutchinson

the right to collect child support from his former spouse.
This Court has held that when a wife seeks temporary child
support during a divorce proceeding but the court's order makes
no provision for such support, the matter is res judicata and
the Department is precluded from seeking reimbursement for that
period.

Mecham v. Mecham, 570 P.2d 123 (Utah 1977).

Similarly, this court has specifically held that a parental support obligation is res judicata where a Divorce Decree
orders one spouse to pay child support, but does not order the
other spouse to pay support.

Karren v. Department of Social

Services, 716 P.2d 810 (Utah 1986).

In Karren, this court held

that an existing court order between the parties barred the
Department from seeking reimbursement from the spouse who was
not ordered to pay child support.
One of the few times that the Department is not bound by
existing orders is when it does not receive notice of the
pending adjudication of support duties.

Knudson v. Utah State

Department of Social Services, 660 P.2d 258 (Utah 1983).
Knudson, this court held that the Department's subrogated

.
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In

rights to child support payments required that the Department
be given the necessary notice to intervene and enforce the
support obligation. In both Knudson and Mecham, the Department
sought recovery of assistance rendered during the pendency of
the divorce proceedings.

In the present case, the Department

assisted Petitioner's former spouse after the Divorce Decree
was entered.

Unlike Knudson, the Divorce Decree adjudicating

support obligations in this case was entered prior to the
payment of any assistance by the Department of Social Services.
The Department therefore had no interest in the support question at the time of the Petitioner's Decree, and Knudson is not
controlling.
In this jurisdiction, the doctrine of res judicata renders
a final judgment, on the merits, by a court of competent
jurisdiction, conclusive upon the parties and is a bar to
subsequent litigation of the same issues.
629 P.2d 892 (Utah 1981).

Bernard v. Attebury,

In the present case, the court has

allocated child support and the Petitioner was not ordered to
pay it.

The Petitioner's duty of child support has been fixed,

an order exists, and the issue is res judicata.

In so allocat-

ing child support, the court is not obligated to add that
support from the other party is not ordered.

It is sufficient

that child support was a material issue that

was actually

adjudicated, and that the Petitioner was not ordered to pay it.
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II. MODIFICATION OF A COURT-ORDERED
SUPPORT OBLIGATION MAY NOT BE MADE IN
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS.
A modification of a support obligation must be made
through a court rather than an administrative proceeding.
U.C.A., 1953, §30-3-5(3) (Supp. 1985).

Utah law grants to the

District Court the power to enter child custody and support
decrees, and also provides the court with continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for custody or
support of the children:
The court has continuing jurisdiction to make
subsequent changes or new orders for the
support and maintenance of the parties, the
custody of the children and their support,
maintenance, health, and dental care, or the
distribution of the property as is reasonable
and necessary. U.C.A., 1953, §30-3-5(3)
(Supp. 1985).
This section provides the District Court the exclusive jurisdiction to modify a support decree later on if circumstances
change.

Christensen v. Christensen, 628 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1981).

Under the Act, the Department is given the power to
collect unpaid support debts that accrue under existing court
orders, and in some instances where no order exists.
1953 §78-45b-4 and -5 (Supp. 1985).

U.C.A.,

However, neither the Act

Section 30-3-5(3) grants the power to the Department to modify
an already existing support order in an administrative action.
The power to modify a decree is exclusively retained by the
courts under U.C.A., 1953, §30-3-5 (Supp. 1985).

Thus, the

Department may not redetermine Petitioner's support obligation
through an administrative proceeding.
Mecham, 576 P.2d at 125.
- 6 -

Karren, 716 P.2d at 812;

This court has held that an action based on the Public
Support of Children Act is not the proper procedure to modify a
Divorce Decree.

Karren, 716 P.2d at 812. The Petitioner does

not claim that she may never be required to provide additional
support for her children.

She merely claims that in order for

that duty of support to be changed, the existing court order
must be properly modified.
While acknowledging that in some cases the duty of support
and an appropriate amount of support may be determined in an
administrative proceeding, the Karren court held that the
Department could not seek reimbursement when there had been a
decree of divorce previously entered fixing the amount of
support and/or alimony to be paid.

The court determined that

the Department may not unilaterally determine the amount of
support and then enforce the right of reimbursement under the
Act.

The same principle applies to Petitioner in the instant

case:

the Department may not unilaterally determine that the

Petitioner is obligated to provide child support when a court
order providing otherwise exists.
III. MODIFICATION OF AN EXISTING SUPPORT
SUPPORT OBLIGATION MAY NOT BE IMPOSED
RETROACTIVELY, BUT ONLY PROSPECTIVELY.
The law of this state only allows an existing support
obligation to be modified prospectively and not retroactively.
Karren, 716 P.2d at 812; Larsen v. Larsen, 561 P.2d 1077 (Utah
1977).

Alimony and support payments become unalterable debts

as they accrue.

A periodic installment cannot be changed or

modified after installments have become due.

- 7 -

Karren, 716 P.2d

at 812.

In Larsen the Department sought a judgment for child

support funds that the Department had already provided up to
that point.

This court rejected the argument for retroactive

support, holding that a modification could not apply to periods
of time in the past, regardless of the circumstances, since the
Divorce Decree.

Thus, only prospective modification of a

support obligation is proper.

Karren, 716 P.2d at 812.

CONCLUSION
The Petitioner's obligation to pay child support has been
adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction, and she was
not ordered to make support payments.

The issue of a support

obligation is thus res judicata as to the Department's claim of
reimbursement against the Petitioner, and the Petitioner has
the right to rely on the finality and enforceability of that
judgment.
The law of this state does not allow the Department of
Social Services to modify a Divorce Decree through an administrative proceeding.

If circumstances justify a modification,

the Department must follow the proper procedure and petition
the court for a modification.

The Departments unilateral

modification of an existing court order was both improper and
unlawful.
If circumstances change and the existing order is modified, the law in this jurisdiction only provides for prospective, and not retroactive, modification.
Therefore, the decision of the Department of Social
Services Administrative Court should be reversed and Petitioner

- 8 -

should be held harmless from a child support obligation owed to
the Department for the time period in question.

DATED t h i s

jD

day of Cv J/IMAAJ^CV

, 1987.

CUtflSA L. BAKER
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant
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ADDENDUM
EXHIBIT
PUBLIC SUPPORT OF CHILDREN ACT
Utah Code Ann., 1953 §78-45b-l-24

A

MARSHA LEE HUTCHINSON V. JOHN COLLINS HUTCHINSON
Decree of Divorce, Third District Court
State of Utah, June 15, 1972

B

MEMORANDUM OF FINDINGS AND ORDER OF THE
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT, NOVEMBER 23, 1983

C

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Third District Court, State of Utah
June 19, 1986

D
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Chapter 45b. Public Support of Children
7g-4Sb-l. Short title.
7S-45b-l.l. Common-law and statutory remedies
augmented by act * Publk policy*
7S-45b-2. DeflnJiious.
7t-45b-3. Applicant's right to sopport from other potty
assigned to department • Enforcement.
7S«45b-3.5. Collection of support debt upon redoes! of
agency of another state.
7g-45b-4. Notice of support debt • Court order.
7M55-5. Notice of support debt - Absent court order.
7g-45b-6. Person aggrieved by action of department <
Hearing - Request In writing • Time • Location of
bearing • Hearing examiner determination and record
Alleged responsible parent failing to appear.
7M5b-6.1. Findings and order by department •
J udJcimT review.
7M5b;7. Uens authorized • Probable cause and
procedure.
7g-45b-8. Show cause order • Procedure • Hearing.
7g~45b-9. Filing and docketing of final orders • Liens
• Execution.
7l45b*9.5. Docketing of final order • Issuance of writ
of execution or garnishment.
7a-45b~10. Effect of lien.
78-45b-ll. Collection of support debt In ben Procedure • Alternative remedy.
7g-45b~12* Executed lien - Rights of persons owning
property.
7M5b-13. Requirement to honor voluntary assignment
of earnings • Discharge of employee prohibited «
Liability for discharge • Earnings subject to support Den
or garnishment.
7S-4Sb-14. Recovery against obligor • Disbursement.
7g-45b*15. Attorney general • Power to grant Immunity
• Privileged testimony - Person refusing to answer
questions or product evidence • Procedure for attorney
general • Procedure for court - Effect on witness.
7l-45b-16. Department release.
7MSb-17. Power of department over schedule of
payments.
7g-45b-!7.1. Posting of bond or security for payment of
support debt.
7M5b-lS. Extensions of time for good cause anthorired
• Service of documents.
7M5b-19. Actions involving orders prohibited unless
plaintiff applies to department for bearing.
7g-45b-20. Conflict of orders.
7t-45b-21. Charge off of uncoliectibte support debts.,
7M5b-22. Repealed.
7M5b*23. Medical and dental expenses of dependent
children • Assigning responsibility for payment
Insurance coverage provision in order.
78-45b-24. Provision of support debt information to
consumer reporting agency.

78-45b*l. Short title.
This act shall be known and may J>c cited as
•Public Support of Children Act.*
i
78-45b-l.l. Common-law and statutory
remedies augmented by act • Public policy.
The State of Utah, exercising its police and i
reign power, declares that the common-law
statutory remedies pertaining to family de
and nonsupport of minor dependent children
be augmented by this act which is directed to
real and personal property resources of the respon
sible parents. In order to render resources mor
immediately available to meet the needs of mino
children, it is the legislative intent that the remedie
herein provided are in addition to, and not in Iieul
of, Existing law. It is declared to be the public policy]
of this state that this chapter be liberally couuoicdl
and administered to the end that children shall bcT
I the UTAH AOV

REPORTS

£S&*2i

Exhibit A

parents, thereby relieving or avoiding, at least in
part, the burden often bonie by the general citizenry
ihrough welfare programs.
ttn
1M5b-2. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Department* means the State Department of
Social Services.
(2) "Dependent child" means any person under
ihc age of 18 who is not otherwise emancipated, selfsupporting, married, or a member of the armed
forces of the United States.
(3) "Court order" means any judgment or order
of any district court of this state or of any court of
comparable jurisdiction of another state ordering
payment of a set or determinable amount of support
money.
(4) "Order" means an order issued in any proceeding under this chapter by an administrative law
judge after a hearing and a determination of both
the ability of the obligor to pay and the need of the
dependent child or children, which orders payment
of a set or determinable amount of support money.
(5) "Support debt" means:
(a) the debt created by nonpayment of child
support, maintenance, health, or dental care under
ihe laws of this state or the decree of any court of
appropriate jurisdiction ordering a sum to be paid
as child support, maintenance, health, or dental
care; and
(b) The debt created by nonpayment of an
obligation for the support of a spouse or former
spouse with whom the debtor's child resides, if that
obligation is ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction or an administrative body under state law,
and if the debtor also owes a support obligation to
the spouse's child, which is being enforced by the
state.
(6) "Need* means the necessary costs of food,
clothing, shelter, and medical attendance for the
support of any dependent child.
(7) "Disposable earnings" means that part of the
earnings of an individual remaining after the deduction from those earnings of all amounts required
by law to be withheld.
(8) "Assistance* means assistance for aid to families with dependent children, and public funds
expended for the reasonable and necessary health
and dental care of a dependent child.
(9) "Person" includes any natural person, firm,
corporation, association, political subdivision, or
department.
(10) "Responsible parent* means the natural
parent, adoptive oarent. or stcoDarent of a dependent child.
(11) "Earnings" means compensation paid or
payable for personal services, whether denominated
as v,ages, salary, commission, bonus, or otherwise,
and specifically includes periodic payment pursuant
to pension or retirement programs, or insurance
policies of any type, including unemployment compensation insurance benefit payments. Earnings shall
specifically include all gain derived from capital,
from labor, or from both combined, including
profit gained through sale or conversion of capital
assets.
(12) 'Stepparent* means a person ceremonially
married to a child's natural or adoptive parent who
is not the child's natural or adoptive parent or one
living with the natural or adoptive parent as a
comr.*.w
.w spouse, whose common law marriage
*as er
mto in. a state w*
"o^nizes the

w (Uj "UDJtKor means any person owins 10111
support.
(14)/Obligee" means any person to whom *
of support is owed.
78-45b-3. Applicant's right to support from
other party assigned to department
Enforcement.
(l)(a) As a condition of eligibility for asslsti
an applicant for or recipient of assistance is c
dered to have assigned to the state all right
support from any other person which have ace
at the time the assignment is executed or (if no
executed) at the time of application for assisti
and which the applicant or recipient may have i
or her own behalf or in behalf of any other fi
member for whom the applicant or recipiei
applying for or receiving assistance. Any rig!
support which an applicant or recipient of p
assistance has or claims, passes to the state 1
the assignment, or by operation of law upon re
of assistance by the recipient even if the reci
does not execute an assignment. If assistan
furnished by the department or if the depart
has contracted to collect support, the depart
shall become trustee of any cause of actio
claims of the obligee or any minor child in
obligee's custody, to recover support due to
obligee from any person and may bring and 1
tain the action either in its own name or in the i
of the obligee.
(b) The department shall have the pow<
attorney to act in the name of any recipient in
orsing and cashing any and all drafts, ch
money orders or other negotiable instruments
ived by the department and representing suj
payments for children in whose behalf assistanc
been previously paid.
(2) In any action filed under this, chapter
department shall be deemed a real pafty in ini
upon the payment of any support. Every ot
shall be deemed to have received noticfe of the 1
of the department by his failure to provide ax
the obligee's receipt of support.
(3) All obligees, upon request of the depart!
shall execute and deliver such instruments
papers and do whatever else is necessary in co
tion with such cause of action. No obligee shj
anything, after the receipt of assistance fron
department, to prejudice those rights.
(4) No agreement between any obligee anc
obligor either relieving an obligor of any du
support or responsibility therefor or purportii
settle past, present, or future support obligj
either as settlement or prepayment shall a
reduce or terminate any rights of the departnu
recover from that obligor for support pro
unless the department has consented to the 1
ment in writing.
(5) Any court order embodying a money judj
for support to be paid to an obligee by any p
shall be deemed in favor of the department t
extent of the amount of the department's rigt
recover from the judgment debtor. This transl
interest shall be applicable to court orders inclu
but not limited to, temporary spouse support 01
family maintenance orders, or alimony order
the benefit of a dependent child but allocated I
benefit of that child on the basis of providini
essities to the person in whose custody that d
dent child resides.
(6) The department shall have the right to pc

outlined by the rulesof the department or in acco^
(7) The department is hereby authorized to udopt rdancc with Rule 4 of Utah Rules of. Civil Proceand enforce such rules and regulations as may be dure.
(2) If a written answer is received by the departnecessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter,
including but not limited to rules for narrowing ment, a hearing shall be set in the manner provided
issues and simplifying^ the methods of proof at under section 78-4Sb-6 and reasonable notwe of,
hearings, such rules and regulations shall include that hearing shall be forwarded to the alleged resp»
procedures for notice and the manner of serving the onsible parent in the manner prescribed under subsame on all orders of support debt or any hearings section (1).
(3) If payment \$ not received as demanded under
requested regarding contested decisions. Such rules
subsection
(1) and no written answer is Tiled within
may be changed from time to time at the depart20 days from the date of service, the department
ment's discretion.
(8) The department for the purposes mentioned in may proceed to assess and determine that support
this title, through its director or his authorized rep- debt according to the terms of the court order and,
resentatives, shall have power to administer oaths to at any time thereafter, may proceed with approprcertify to official acts, issue subpoenas, compel iate collection actions as provided in subsection (I).
(4) If a determination of financial responsibility is
witnesses and the production of books, accounts,
made by the department, an order in that regard
documents, and evidence.
(9) In enforcing this title, and notwithstanding shall be entered by the department specifying the
other provisions to the contrary, the department amount determined to be owing, the support debt
shall have the power to assess interest not to exceed accrued or.accruing and, wh$re appropriate, the
1% per month on any amounts due and not paid amount to be paid thereon each month, the name of.
within one month. All notices and bills issued by the the recipient or custodian, the name of the child for
department to obligors shall advise the obligor of whom assistance is being paid or is to be paid, and
the department's power to assess interest and the a statement of the amount of periodic future
amount thereof, if assessed. Such amount shall be support payments that obligor shall be responsible
added to and accrued as arrearages until paid.
ttu for. Notice of that order shall be given in the same
manner provided for notices under subsection (1).
78-45b-3.5. Collection of support debt upon
That
order shall automatically become final unless a
request of agency of another state.
(1) The department may proceed under Section 78- hearing is requested within the time and in the
45b-3 to collect a support debt from an obligor manner provided under section 78-45b-6 and the
who is located In or is a resident of this state rega- order shall so state.
(5) When a notice of support debt is properly
rdless of the presence or residence of the obligee, if
that action is requested by an agency of another served upon an obligor pursuant to this act, the
state which is operating under Title IV-D of the obligor shall be responsible for notifying the department by certified mail, return receipt requested, of
Social Security Act.
tw?
(2) If the department proceeds against an obligor any change of address or employment.
78-4Sb-5.
Notice
of
support
debt
•
Absent
court
under Subsection (1), it shall seek enforcement of
order.
the liability imposed by the laws of the state where
(1) In the absence of a court order, the director
the obligor was located during the period for which
support is sought. The obligor is presumed to have may issue a notice of a support debt accrued or
been present in this state during that period until accruing based upon the furnishing of support by
the department for the benefit of any dependent
otherwise shown.
(3) If an obligee is absent from this state and the child. That notice shall include a statement of the
obligor presents evidence which constitutes a support debt accrued or accruing, computable on
defense, the administrative hearing examiner shall the basis of the amount of assistance paid or to be
continue the case for further hearing and submission paid, a statement of the name of the recipient and
the name of the minor child for whom assistance is
of evidence by both parties.
(4) The remedies provided by this section are .being provided, a demand for immediate payment
additional to those remedies provided by the of the support debt or in the alternative for a
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, written answer from that person to the department
Chapter 31, Title 77.
ins setting forth any claimed defenses to liability, and
requesting a hearing thereon, and a statement that if
78-45b-4. Notice of support debt • Court order.
(1) The department may issue a notice of a neither answer nor full payment are received within
support debt accrued or accruing based upon any twenty days from the date of service the department
court order and shall include a demand for immed- may assess and determine that support debt and
iate payment of the support debt or in the alterna- that, subsequent thereto, the property of that person
tive for a written answer from that person to the shall be subject to appropriate collection action
department setting forth any claimed defenses to including, but not limited to, execution upon liens,
liability, and requesting a hearing thereon, and a wage assignments, attachment, and garnishment.
statement that if neither answer nor full payment This notice shall be served upon the alleged respoare received within 20 days from the date of service nsible parent in the manner prescribed for service of
the department may assess and determine that notices under section 78-45b-4.
support debt according to the terms of the court
(2) If a written answer is received by the departorder and that, subsequent thereto, the property of ment, a hearing shall be set in the manner provided
that person shall be subject to appropriate collection under section 78-45b-6 and reasonable notice of
action including, but not limited to, execution upon that hearing shall be forwarded to the alleged resphens, wage assignments, attachment, and garnish- onsible parent in the manner prescribed under
ment. This notice shall be served upon the person section 78-45b-4.
sul »-t to that court order de* - 'ng payment
(3) If payment is not received as demanded under
aoic 10 ao so.
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mcnt may (proceeo 10 assess ana determine inai
support debt and. at any time thereafter, may
proceed with appropriate collection actions as provided in that subsection.
(4) If a determination of financial responsibility is
made by the department, an order in that regard
shall be entered by the department specifying the
amount determined to be owing, the support debt
accrued or accruing and, where appropriate, the
amount to be paid thereon each month, the name of
the recipient or custodian, the name of the child for
whom assistance is being paid or is to be paid, and
a statement of the amount of periodic future
support payments the obligor shall be responsible
for. Notice of that order shall be given in the same
manner provided for notices under section 78-45b4. That order shall automatically become final
unless a hearing is requested within the time and in
the manner provided under section 78-45b-6 and
the order shall so state.
ins
7M5b-6. Person aggrieved by action of
department - Hearing • Request in writing
Time - Location of hearing - Hearing examiner
determination and record • Alleged responsible
parent failing to appear.
(1) Any person aggrieved regarding notice of
support debt or other issue of fact shall be afforded
an opportunity for a hearing upon request in writing
Hied with the director not more than twenty days
after notification of the adverse action. The hearings
provided sha\\ be conducted by admimsuative
hearing examiners designated by the department. All
hearings shall be held in the county of residence or
other place convenient to such person and shall be
so held within thirty days after request therefor is
filed, except that the department may promulgate
such rules for postponements and continuances as
may be in the interest of justice.
(2) The administrative hearing examiner, after full
and fair hearing, conducted in accordance with the
rules and regulations of the department shall make
specific findings regarding the liability and responsibility, if any, of the alleged responsible parent and
the amount of such liability computable on the basis
of the amount of assistance paid or to be paid. In
making these findings, the hearing officer shall
include in his deliberations the necessities and requirements of the child, exclusive of any income of
the custodian of said child, the amount of the
support debt claimed, the amount of assistance paid
or to be paid, the abilities and resources of the responsible parent, and the public policy and intent of
the legislature to require that children be maintained
from the resources of responsible parents thereby
relieving to the greatest extent possible the burden
upon the general citizenry through welfare programs. An official record of the hearing shall be
made and maintained by the department. The
hearing officer shall file his findings with the department, not more than twenty days after the conclusion of the heaiing.
(3) if the alleged responsible parent fails to appear
at the time and place set for hearing, upon a
shoeing of proper notice to that parent, the hearing
examiner shall enter his findings in accordance with
the provisions of the notice of support payment
unless he shall determine that no good cause therefor exists.
1977

Vij upon receipi o i m e administrative ncartnj
officer's report of findings on the issues designated
for hearing, the department may accept the report
of findings as the basis for a final order or upon
filing * statement of the legal or substantial factual
basis in the record therefor, it may:
(a) Reject all or any portion of the findings and
remand for further hearing and findings on specified
issues;
(b) Disregard any portion of the findings and
proceed to enter a final order based upon the remainder of the findings;
(c) Substitute alternative or additional findings
of act on the issues designated for hearing, if the
substituted findings are supported by a preponderance of the evidence in the record. The department
shall then cause its findings and order to be served
upon the responsible parent.
(2) When findings and an order have been entered
by the department subsequent to a hearing, judicial
review of those findings and order may be secured
by any person adversely affected thereby by filing a
petition in the district court of the county where the
hearing was conducted within 30 days after receipt
of notice of that order. The petition shall state the
grounds upon which review is sought. At the time of
the filing of the petition, a copy thereof shall be
served upon the department, which service may be
accomplished by mailing to the department of to the
legal counsel who represented the department at the
hearing. The petitioner and A t department shall in
all cases be deemed original parties to the judicial
review. With its answer, the department shall certify
and file with the court all documents, exhibits,
papers and a transcript of all testimony taken in the
matter, together with its findings and order.
(3) Within 20 days after the filing of the answer,
the petitioner shall file and serve a memorandum of
points and authorities, supporting in detail the
grounds set forth in the petition for judicial review.
If the petitioner relies upon the transcript, he shall
cite in the memorandum the pages and the lines in
the transcript upon which he relies.
(4) Within 20 days after the filing of the memorandum by the petitioner, the department shall file
and serve a memorandum of answering points and
authorities. If the department relies upon the transcript, the department shall cite in its memorandum
the pages and the lines in the transcript upon which
it relies.
(5) Upon expiration of the time permitted for
filing of the memorandum of answering points and
authorities or upon the filing of the memorandum,
either party may notify the clerk to submit the
matter for decision, which shall be made without
oral argument unless oral argument is requested by
cither party or the court.
itt3
78-45b-7. Liens authorized - Probable cause and
procedure.
((1)] If the department has probable cause for
being justly apprehensive of losing property which
could become subject to a collection action to
satisfy the support debt due to the fact that the
alleged responsible parent is not a resident of this
state, that he has assigned, disposed of or concealed, or is about to assign, dispose of or conceal,
any of his property with intent to defraud the department, or that he has departed or is about to
depart from tne state to the injury of the department, the department may file and serve liens pur-
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fair hearing or thereafter, whether or not appealed.
(2) In cases where action is taken pending a fair
hearing the department shall Tile in the record of the
hearing an affidavit stating the reasons for!such
action. If the alleged debtor shall furnish bond with
sufficient sureties, satisfactory to the department in
an amount double the amount claimed by the department during the pendency of the hearing or thereafter, in which case those hens shall be released. If
the decision of the hearing officer shall be in favor
of the debtor, all liens shall be released.
(3) No execution upon liens may be instituted
pursuant to this act, however, unless the requirements of providing notice for payment have been first
met by the department.
ws
7S-45b-S. Show cause order • Procedure •
Hearing.
In addition to, or in lieu of, any other action
provided for under this act, in the absence of a
court order, the department may, upon petition by
the responsible parent, or otherwise, issue an order*
based on a material change in circumstances and
good cause, requiring the other party to show cause
why the order previously entered should not be
prospectively modified. That order to show cause,
together with a copy of any affidavit upon which it
is based, shall be served on the other party in the
manner of a summons in a civil action. A hearing
thereon shall then be provided in the same manner,
and determinations shall be based on the same
considerations, as provided under section 78-45b6, but no modification shall be ordered except upon
a showing of good cause and a material change of
circumstances.
lf7S
7S-45b-9. Filing and docketing of final orders Liens • Execution.
(1) An abstract of any final order of a support
debt may be filed with the clerk of any district court
in the state, and shall be docketed in the judgment
docket of that court. The time of receipt of the
abstract shall be noted on the abstract and entered
in the docket.
(2)(a) When an abstract has been filed and docketed, it constitutes a lien from the time of that
docketing upon the real and personal property of
the obligor situated in that county, for a period of
eight years from the date of the award, unless previously satisfied.
(b) Execution of this lien shall be in the same
manner and with the same effect as an execution on
a lien which results from a judgment of the district
court.
(c) This lien is in addition to any other lien
provided by law.
(3) If the obligor or obligee has filed an action for
divorce, a copy of the abstract shall also be filed in
that action.
ins
7M5b-9.5. Docketing of final order - Issuance
of writ of execution or garnishment.
(1) Any final order issued by the department shall
>e docketed with the department's administrative
locket clerk. A writ of garnishment or execution
nay be issued on the order within the same period,
n the same manner, and with the same effect as if
he writ were issued on a judgment of a district
:ourt. This remedy shall be in addition to any other
remedies provided by law for collecting* on judgments.
(2)u) The department may at any time after
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business, employer, political subdivision, or department of the state possessing earnings, or deposits or'
balances, held in any bank account, or otherwise, of
any nature, which are due, owing, or belonging to
the obligor.
(b) A, writ of garnishment or execution issued
under this section shall be signed by the director of
his designee, and shall be delivered by certified mail,
return receipt requested, or as prescribed by Rule 4
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
mi
7S-45b-10. Effect of lien.
After receipt of notice of the filing of any support
lien under this act by the department, no person In
possession of any property which may be subject to
that lien shall pay over, release, sell, transfer, encumber, or convey such property to any person other
than the department, unless he first receives a
release or waiver thereof from the department, or a
court order ordering release of the lien on the basis
that the debt does not exist or has been satisfied.
Whenever any such person has in his possession
earnings, deposits, accounts, or balances in excess of
$100 more than the amount of the debt claimed by
the department, that person may, without liability
under this act, release such excess to the debtor. \rn
7S-45b-ll. Collection of support debt In lien •
Procedure • Alternative remedy.
Whenever a support lien has been filed pursuant
to this act, the department may collect the support
debt stated in said lien by the execution upon and
sale of the property subject to said lien. The department shall give notice to the debtor and any
person known to have or claim an interest therein of
the general description of the property to be sold
and the time and. place of sale of said property. Said
notice shall be given to such persons by service in
the manner prescribed for the service of a summons
in a civil action. A notice specifying the property to
be sold shall be posted in at least two public places
in the county wherein the seizure has been made.
The time of sale shall not be less than ten nor more
than twenty days from the date of posting of such
notices. Said sale shall be conducted by the department which shall proceed to sell such property by
parcel or by lot at a public auction, and which may
set a minimum reasonable price to include the expenses of making a levy and of advertising the sale/
and if the amount bid for such property at the sale
is not equal to the price so fixed, the department
may declare such property to be purchased by the
department for such price, or may conduct another
sale of such property pursuant to the provisions of
this section. Property as herein prescribed may be
sold by the director at public or private sale, and the
amount realized shall be placed in the state general
fund to the credit of the department. In all cases of
such sale, the director shall issue a bill of sale or
deed to the purchaser and said bill of sale or deed
shall be prima facie evidence of the right of the
director to make such sale and conclusive evidence
of the regularity of his proceeding in making the
sale, and shall transfer to the purchaser all right,
title, and interest of the debtor in said property. The
proceeds of any such sale, except in those cases
wherein the property has been acquired by the department, shall be first applied by the director to
reimbursement of the costs of sale, including reasonable attorneys9 fees and, thereafter, in satisfaction of the delinquent account. Any excess which
shall thereafter remain in the hands of the director
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km debt, costs and reasonable attorney fees, at a n y
-JOT before sale, shall satisfy the lien a n d terminate
farther procedures. Wher^ the net proceeds o f sale
:pon application t o the debt claimed d o not satisfy
k debt in full, the department shall have judgment
3ver for any deficiency remaining unsatisfied. and
liriher levy and sales upon other property o f the
•udgment debtor m a y be m a d e under the same exertion, in all sales contemplated under this section,
Jvenising o f notice shall only be necessary for t w o
•eeks in a newspaper published in the county where
aid property is located, and if there be n o newspiper therein, then in the most convenient newspaper
'jving a circulation in such county. Remedies proved for herein arc alternatives to remedies proved for in other sections o f this chapter.
1977
*W5b-12. Executed lien - Rights of persons
•»Qtng property.
Any person o w n i n g real property, or any interest
£ real property, against which a support lien has
been executed upon pursuant t o section 78-45b!!, shall have the right, prior t o sale, to pay the
rcount due, together with expenses o f the procee±ig> and reasonable attorneys' fees, to the deparrrnt and upon such payment the department shall
rntorc that property to him and all further execut e proceedings shall cease. A n y such person shall
ilso have the right, within ninety days after sale o f
u:h property under section 78-455-11 to redeem
u.d property by making payment to the purchase
> i in the amount paid by the purchaser plus intern ihereon at the rate o f 6% per annum.
1975
*M$b-13. Requirement to honor voluntary
isiignment of earnings - Discharge of employee
prohibited - Liability for discharge - Earnings
tubject to support lien or garnishment.
|1) Every person, firm, corporation, association,
jehtical subdivision, or department of the state shall
Wnor according to its terms, a duly executed volu:ur> assignment o f earnings which is presented by
t< department as a plan t o satisfy or retire a
import debt or obligation. This requirement to
fcror the assignment o f earnings and the assignt:ru of earnings itself shall be applicable whether
uJ earnings are to be paid presently or in the
V.urc and shall continue in effect until released in
•raing by the department. Payment o f moneys
r-rsuant to an assignment o f earnings presented by
X department shall serve as full acquittance under
r> contract o f employment, and the state shall
fcfend the employer and hold him harmless for any
raon taken pursuant to the assignment o f earnings.
!>.e department shall be released from liability for
^proper receipt o f moneys under an assignment o f
agings upon return of any moneys s o received.
(2) No employer may discharge or prejudice any
rployee by reason o f the fact that his earnings
INC been subjected to support lien, wage assignor!!, or garnishment for any indebtedness under
(3) Should any person discharge an employee in
oiation of Subsection (2), that person shall be
jb!e to the employee for such damages as he m a y
wffcr, and, additionally, to the department in an
r.aunt equal t o the debt which is the basis o f the
alignment plus costs, interest, and attorneys' fees,
ximaximum of $1,000, whichever is less.
(4) The maximum part o f the aggregate disposable
- rgi of an trJiviJual for any work pay period
»* ;h may be subjected t o a support lien or garni•rx to enforce payment o f a judgment arising

not exceed SCWt or nis atsposaoic coming* • « . ...»
work pay period.
(5) Whenever a support lien or • garnishment is
served upon a n y person, asserting a support debt
against earnings a n d there is in the possession o f
such person any such earnings, 5 0 % o f the disposable earnings shall be disbursed t o the debtor
whether such earnings are paid, or are t o be paid
weekly, monthly, or at other regular intervals a n d
whether there be due the debtor earnings for o n e
week or for a longer period. T h e support lien or
garnishment shall continue to operate and require
said person t o withhold the nonexempt portion o f
earnings at each succeeding earnings disbursement
interval until released in writing from the department.
19*4
78-45b-14. Recovery against obligor •
Disbursement.
If any recovery is obtained against an obligor,
pursuant t o this act, it shall be disbursed as follows:
(1) T h e reasonable expense o f the action, including attorneys' fees, shall be paid and charged
proportionately against the parties as their interests
may appear. N o attorneys* fees chargeable t o the
department may exceed 15% o f any such recovery.
Such fee is to be a credit upon any fee payable by
the obligee for any recovery had against an obligor.
Before proceeding against an obligor, an obligee
shall give written notice o f such intention t o the
department, in order to give that department a reasonable opportunity to enter an appearance in the
proceeding.
(2) T h e department shall be reimbursed in full for
all payments made less the proportionate share o f
costs and attorneys' fees as provided in subsection
(1).
(3) The balance o f any Such recovery, after
payment of those items provided in subsections (1)
and (2), shall be paid to the obligee.
1975
78-45b-15. Attorney general - Power to grant
immunity - Privileged testimony - Person
refusing to answer questions or produce evidence
- Procedure for attorney general - Procedure
for court - Effect on witness.
In any investigation or prosecution of any proceeding against an obligor seeking adjudication of
support rights of an obligee or dependent child,
whether by way of paternity proceedings, divorce
proceedings, orders to show cause, temporary
support proceedings, family maintenance proceedings, or other similar proceedings, the attorney
general shall have the power to grant immunity
from prosecution to any obligor, putative father,
mother of a child born out of wedlock or determined not to be the issue of a marriage, or any other
person w h o is called or intended to be called, as a
witness whenever he deems that the testimony o f
such person is necessary to the proper determination
of that proceeding. N o prosecution shall be instituted against the person for any crime disclosed by
his testimony which is privileged under this action;
however, should that person testify falsely, nothing
herein contained shall be construed to prevent prosecution for perjury.
If, during the investigation or prosecution, a
person refuses to answer questions or produce evidence of any kind on the ground that he may be
incriminated thereby, the attorney general may file a
request in writing with the district court in which the
examination is being conducted for an order requiring that person to answer the question or produce
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the court to sbo* cause, if any he has, why the
question should no* be answered of the, evidence
produced, and the court shall order the question
answered or the evidence produced unless it finds
that to do so would be dearly contrary to the public
interest, or could subject the witness to a criminal
prosecution in another jurisdiction. If the witness
still refuses to answer or produce the evidence, he
shall be guilty of contempt of court and punished
accordingly. If the witness comptics with the order
and he would have been privileged to withhold the
answer given or the evidence produced by him
except for this section, that person shall not be
prosecuted or subjected to penalty or forfeiture on
account of any fact or act concerning which he was
ordered to answer or produce evidence except he
may nevertheless be prosecuted or subjected to
penalty for any perjury, false swearing or contempt
committed in answering, failing to answer, or for
producing or failing to produce any evidence in
accordance with the order,
tfis
7S-45b-16. Department release.
The department may at any time release a support
lien, wage assignment, attachment of garnishment,
on all or part of the property of the debtor, or
return seized property without liability, if assurance
of payment is deemed adequate by the department
or if said action will facilitate the collection of the
debt, but said release or return shall not operate to
prevent future action to collect from the same or
other property. The department may also waive any
provisions providing for the collection of interest on
accounts due, if such waiver would facilitate the
collection of the debt,
w$
7S-45b-17. Power of department over schedule of
payments.
The department may at any time consistent with
the income, earning capacity and resources of the
debtor, set or reset a level and schedule of payments
to be paid upon the debt and may cancel such schedule of payments and demand payment in full at
any time he is justly apprehensive, as set forth in
section 78-45b-7, of losing property which could
become subject to a collection action to satisfy the
support debt.
l*&
7*-45b-17J. Potting ot bond or security for
payment of support debt.
(l)(a) The department shall, or an obligee may,
petition the court for an order requiring an obligor
to post a bond or provide other security for the
payment of a support debt, when the department or
an obligee determines that action is appropriate, if
the payments arc more than 90 days delinquent. The
department shall establish rules for determining
when it shall seek an order for security.
(b) For purposes of this section, 'support debt*
includes court ordered obligations for the support of
a spouse or former spouse with whom the child
resides, if that support is collected with the child
support.
(2) When the department or an obligee petitions
the court under this section, it shall give written
notice to the obligor, stating:
(a) the amount of support debt;
(b) that it has petitioned the court for an order
requiring the obligor to post security; and
(c) that the obligor has the right to appear
before the court and con?- fhe department's or
obligee's petition.

?50

other security to be deposited upon the department's or obligee's showing of a support deft ind
of * reasonable basis for the security.
Ms
7M5b48. Extensions of tb»t for good C M *
authorized . Service of documents.
(1) Whenever, for good cause, it appear! that Art
extension of time should be given in relation to thy
proceedings under this act, the ume shall be
granted.
(2) The manner provided for service of any documents under this act shall be in addition to other
manners of service provided by law.
ws
7I-45M9. Actions involving orders prohibited
unless plaintiff applies to department for bearing.
No action, proceeding, or suit to set aside, vacate,
or amend an order issued under this chapter, may
be brought unless the plaintiff first applies to the
department for a hearing on every issue to be presented in the action, proceeding, or suit.
m*
7S-45b-20. Conflict of orders.
If any order pursuant to this act is, or becomes,
in conflict with any order of a court of competent
jurisdiction, to the extent of such conflict the court
order shall govern.
tsrs
7«*45b-2l» Charge off of uncollectible support
debts.
The department may charge off as uncollectible
any support debt upon which it finds there is no
available, practical and lawful means by which that
debt may be collected and may transfer those accounts from accounts receivable to a suspense account
and cease to account for them as assets.
ttrs
78*45b-22. Repealed.
tm
7M5b-23. Medical and dental expenses of
dependent children - Assigning responsibility for
payment • Insurance coverage provision in
order.

In any action under this chapter the department
or the administrative hearing examiner shall include
in its order a provision assigning responsibility for
the payment of reasonable and necessary medical
and dental expenses of the dependent children. If
coverage is available at a reasonable cost, the department or the examiner may also include a provision requiring the purchase and maintenance of
appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for those children.
ISM
7ft*45b-24. Provision or support debt information
to consumer reporting agency.
(1) As used in this section "consumer reporting
agency" means any person who, for monetary fees,
dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly
assembles or evaluates consumer credit information
bearing on credit worthiness, standing or capacity,
for the purpose of furnishing consumer credit
reports to third parties.
(2) The department shall supply information regarding a support debt in excess of $1,000 to any
consumer reporting agency only upon its request.
(3) The department may supply information regarding a support debt of $1,000 or less to a consumer reporting agency only upon its request.
(4) Before it supplies any information to a consumer reporting agency under this section, the department shall give written notice to the obligor,
specifying the information which will be disclosed to
the consumer reporting agency and providing the
obligor with a reasonable opportunity to contest the
accuracy of the information in an administrative
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hearing.
(5) The department shall establish rules Implementing this section.
(6) The department may charge, the consumer
reporting agency a fee for furnishing information
under this section. That fee may not exceed the
department's actual cost of providing the information.
(7) The notice provisions of this section do not
apply to a support debt which has been reduced to
judgment and is public information.
ins

LELAND K.
MMER
w
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f
'
60C Utaji S a v i n g s B u i l d i n g
*
S a l t Lake C i t j , Utah 8 4 1 1 1
Telephone:
364-3625
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIPD JUDICAL DISTRICT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

~&S /At
MARSHA LEE HUTCHINSON,
plaintiff.

AtC, Z&66

*
£ -£# ~7£
—
f-Sf
:
: D E C R E E OF DIVORCE

-V3-

A H
"

:

iOHN COLLINS HUTCHINSON,
:
Civil No. D-6455
defendant.
:
*****************************************************
This cause having come on regularly for hearing on the 9th day of June
1972 before the honorable Emmett L» Brown with plaintiff being present *pd
represented by counsel, defendant not present nor represented by counsel, the
Court taking notice of more than 90 days elapsed since filing of plaintiffs
complaint and defendants being duly served with process having failed ta
respond to this action in the time allowed by law^ defendant's default was duly
entered. Plaintiff being »worn and from her testimony adduced the Court being
fully advised in the premises having made and entered its Findings of Facts
and Conclusionsof Law; now on motion Of Leland K* Wimmer, it i s
ORDERED,
1.

ADJUDGED

nd

hereby

DECREED:

That plaintiff be and she is awarded divorce from defendant and each of

the parties is restored to the status of an unmarried person freed from their
bons of matrimony, provided however,

that this decree shall not become

final and absolute until the expiration of three months from date of signing by
judge and entry hereof, provided further, that this decree shall become final
and absolute upon said expiration of three months unless the appeal is pending
or the Court upon its own motion or application of any other person, whether
interested or nd . otherwise orders.
2.

Plaintiff be and she is awarded the sole CARE, CUSTODY and CONTROL

of Diana Michele Hutchinson, born January 2, 1967, and John Collins Hutchinson,
born April 29, 1969, subject to rights of defendant to <nsit said children at
reasonable times and places in accordance with their ages and his facilities.
3.

Plaintiff is awarded judgment against defendant who is rdered to pay to

the sum of Jl^O.00 per month as alimony for the plaintiff for a total of $220.00
each month payable through the office of the Salt Lake County Clerk, Support
and Alimony division, at the rate of $110..00 on the 20th day of June 1972,
$110. 00 on the 5th day of July, $110.00 on the 20th da^ of July 1972 and simi!ir
amounts on the 5th and 20th of each month thereafter.
4. Plaintiff be and she is awarded as her sole and separate property the
1961 Ford Falcon, all furniture, appliances, furnishings and effects which are,
in her personal possession and ccntroL
5. Defendant be and he i s awarded as his sole and separate property the
1945 Dodge Pickup, his fishing and hunting equipment and his personal effects.
6. Plaintiff be and she i s awarded against defendant an additional judgment
in the sum of $250. 00 as attorney fees for the mseand benefit of her attorney
herein together with judgment in the sum of $6„60 for- costs of Court and
specifically reserving the judgment of *75. 00 .as temporary attorneys: fees for
the Order To Show Cause hearing.
7. Plaintiff is awarded against defendant further-judgment in the amount of
$300. 00 as arrears of temporary child support and alimony in this matter.
8. Defendant is ordered to pay and discharge and hold harmless the plaintiff
form all such obligations and indebtedness of the family incurred during the
marriage including by not limited to Granite Furniture Company, Sugarhouse
Appliance Co. , AETNA loan Company and Lincoln Loan Company.
Dated this
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1972.
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D I S T R T C T JJJDGE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct .copy of the foregoing Decree
? UTAH
)
ofDivorce to defendant, John Collins Hutchinson, 1245Garoette'Streeet, Salt Lake
OFSALTLAKE ) _. City, Utah84116, this 15th day of June 1972.
UNDERSIGNED. CLERK OF THE DISTRICT
|)F SALT LAKE~COUNTY, UTAH, DO HERESY
THAT THE ANNEXED AND FOREGOING IS
[AND FULL COPY CF AN ORIGINAL DOCO
|4 FILE IN MY OFFICE AS SUCH CLERK.
| S %fCf HAND AND SEA£ OF SAID C0JJR7

p£H)AY OF

/Q*Z~r

1^<^^^?^^^
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- DEPUTY

•STATE OF UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

STATE OF UTAH
Department of Social Services.
Plaintiff,

:
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:

MEMORANDUM OF FINDINGS
AND ORDER
Case No. 90099582R1
T-12

MARSHA LEE STARKS.
Defendant.
The above-entitled matter came for hearing on the 21st day of
October, 1983, before J. Steven Eklund, Administrative Law Judge,
with the State of Utah represented by Paul D. Vernieu. Deputy Weber
County Attorney, and the defendant appearing personally and represented through counsel. Leland K. Wimmer.
Thereafter, based upon evidence proffered by .counsel for both
parties, the Administrative Law Judge now enters his Statement of
Facts,

STATEMENT OF FACTS
John C. Hutchison and the defendant were married, having two
children born as issue of that marriage, to wit:
John Collins, Jr.

Diana Michele and

Pursuant to a Divorce Decree, dated June 15. 1972.

custody of the just-named children was awarded to the defendant and
Mr. Hutchison was ordered to pay child support of Sixty dollars
($60.00) per month per child.

Based upon a subsequent agreement between Mr. Hutchison and the
defendant. Diana Michele ceased residing with the defendant sometime
in October,.1982.

Two months later, aqain pursuant to an agreement

between Mr. Hutchison and the defendant, John Collins ceased residing
with the defendant and commenced living with Mr. Hutchison.
During the period of time under review, which consists of June,
1983 through October, 1983, Diana Michele has continuously resided
with Mr. Hutchison.

Based on the believable evidence which was

presented during the hearing in question, John Collins ceased
residing with Mr. Hutchison in mid-May, 1983 and has resided with
the defendant since that time.
From June. 1983 through October, 1983, Mr. Hutchison has
received public assistance totaling Seven hundred forty-five dollars
($745.00). which had been provided for the support of the abovenamed two children.

Specifically, said assistance was provided for

both children during June. 1983 and July, 1983.

Since August, 1983,

public assistance has only been provided for the support of one
dependent child.

The amount of monthly assistance so provided has

been reduced from a full one or two-person grant, inasmuch as
Mr. Hutchison has had some income from employment during the five
months under review.
The child support arrearages allegedly owed by the defendant for
the public assistance which has been provided have been computed at
the rate of Sixty dollars ($60.00) per month per child, or a total
of Four hundred twenty dollars ($420.00).

The claimed child support

arrearages have been computed on the basis of that amount of monthly
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child support which Mr. Hutchison was ordered to pay. as set forth
in the parties1 Divorce Decree.

The defendant has made no payments

toward the satisfaction of any alleged obligation to have provided
child support for either and/or both of the children in question
during the period of time under review.
The defendant was unemployed during the five months in question.
Specifically, the defendant has been so unemployed since May. 1982.
at which time her employment was terminated due to a reduction in
force.

At the time of her termination from employment, the defendant

earned Five dollars and forty cents ($5.40) per hour.

During the

hearing, the defendant testified that she does not anticipate being
reemployed for possibly one to two years.
The defendant's present household consists of herself, her husband. John Collins, Jr.. and another child from a previous marriage.
The defendant is pregnant, it being expected that said child will be
born in January. 1984.
From the foregoing, the Administrative Law Judge now makes his
Conclusions of Law.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The defendant asserts that the existing Divorce Decree has never
been modified to require payment by her in satisfaction of any obligation to support the two children in question.

Thus, the defendant

asserts that the instant matter should be dismissed and she not be
required to provide any reimbursement to the State of Utah for the
public assistance which has been provided for the support of those
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two children.

In that respect, the defendant contends that

Mr. Hutchison failed to make payment of his child support obligation
during prior periods of time that the two children resided with her
and that, although she anticipates that one of those children (John
Collins, Jr.) will continue to reside with her, she cannot afford to
also have physical custody of the other child absent the payment of
support for those children by Mr. Hutchison.

Rather, the defendant

asserts that Mr. Hutchison is physically able to work and it is he
who should provide support for the children in question.
Section 78-45b-3(l), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended,
provides:
•In the event that assistance is furnished by the
department..., the department shall become
trustee of any cause of action of the obligee or
any minor child in that obligee's custody, to
recover support due to that obligee from any
person and may bring and maintain the action
either in its own name or in the name of the
obligee."
Section 78-45b-3(2) further provides:
•For purposes of prosecuting any action pursuant
to this act, the department shall be deemed a
real party in interest upon the payment of any
support...."
Section 78-45-4 requires every woman to support her dependent
children.

In State Division of Family Services v. Clark. Utah. 554

P.2d 1310 (1976), the Utah Supreme Court stated:
•The universally recognized rule is that according
to the common consent and customs of mankind one
of the implied promises in the marriage contract
is to support any children that may have been
born into the family. Even more fundamentally.
the duty of parents to support their children
derives from natural law. This is been recognized

from the earliest times as a proposition of such
incontestable correctness that it is neither
subject to doubt nor in need of explanatory
justification—
Importantly, the Court also stated:
M

A necessary concomitant of the continuing and
inalienable duty of parents to support their
children is that if a child is left in need and a
third person comes to the rescue and furnishes
support, the latter is subrogated to the child's
right and may obtain reimbursement therefor."
See also Gulley v. Gulley, Utah, 570 P.2d 127 (1977).
Clearly, based on the provisions of §78-45-3, which requires
every man to support his dependent children, and §78-45-4, quoted
above, the financial responsibility for the support of children is a
joint and several obligation of both parents.

As was stated in Owen

v. Owen, Utah, 579 P.2d 911 (1978):
•[U]nder our law both the mother and the father
are responsible for the support of the children.
Therefore, even though in the decree the duty of
support was placed primarily and mostly upon the
defendant [who was, in that case, the father of
the children], the trial court is not necessarily
obligated to continue that burden entirely and
exclusively upon him."
It should be further recognized is that each parent's statutorily
mandated obligation to provide child support impliedly becomes a
part of every divorce decree involving the welfare of the children
of a marriage.

See Rose v. Rose. Wyo., 576 P.2d 459 (1978).

While it is true that the general rule is that the divorce
decree fixes the obligations of the parties, Stanton v. Stanton, 30
Utah 2d 315, 517 P.2d 1010 (1974), and that where the circumstances
would so justify, the trial court may relieve a parent from the
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obligation to provide child support, Farbush v. Forbush. Utah, 578
P.2d 518 (1978), a distinction must be drawn between an express
order of a District Court that a parent is under no obligation to
provide support for a child of the marriage, as compared to the mere
silence of a divorce decree as to whether any child support obligation is imposed on the non-custodial parent.
The Divorce Decree in the instant case awarded the custody of
the two dependent children to the defendant and ordered Mr. Hutchison
to make payment of a monthly child support obligation in the amount
of Sixty dollars ($60.00) per month per child.

Based on the facts

which existed at the time of the entry of the Decree, that Decree
is understandably silent as to the amount of any child support
obligation which would be owed by the defendant.

However, events

which have occurred subsequent to the entry of the Decree (i.e.,
Mr. Hutchison obtaining physical custody of both children, based
upon an agreement between himself and the defendant, and subsequently receiving public assistance which was provided as support
for those children), may properly give rise to a possible obligation
of the defendant to reimburse the State of Utah for the public
assistance which was provided for the support of her children.
Without doubt, the defendant has both a common law and statutory
obligation to support her children which, for the purposes of this
proceeding, is neither reduced nor eliminated by whatever may be
implied from the language of the parties' Divorce Decree.

The defen-

dant is a 'responsible parent" within the meaning of §78-45b-2(9).
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which defines that term as "the natural parent, adoptive parent, or
stepparent of a dependent child."

Further, as stated in §78-45b-l.l:

"It is declared to be the public policy of this
state that this chapter be liberally construed
and administered to the end that children shall
be maintained from the resources of responsible
parents, thereby relieving or avoiding, at least
in part, the burden often borne by the general
citizenry through welfare programs."
In essence, the existence of an obligation to provide child support
in this matter and the amount of reimbursement owed by the defendant
to the State of Utah may properly be determined in administrative
proceedings initiated pursuant to §78-45b-l et seq.

Further, any

subsequent order requiring the defendant to provide such reimbursement would not conflict with any specific language of the previously
entered Divorce Decree.
Administrative proceedings initiated pursuant to §78-45b-l et
seq., are intended to assess whatever child support obligation may
exist and to set forth that amount of reimbursement to be paid to
the State of Utah, relative to public assistance which has been
provided for the support of dependent children.

Said proceedings

are not intended to assess whether recipients of public assistance
were entitled to receive such assistance.

Notwithstanding the

defendant's assertion that Mr. Hutchison is physically able to work,
there was no sufficient evidence presented during the instant
hearing which would justify a stay of execution on any judgment
entered against the defendant pending an investigation into the
eligibility of Mr. Hutchison to have received the public assistance
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which was so provided for the support of the two children in question.

However, should a referral for such an investigation be made

to the Assistance Payments Administration Office and a determination
subsequently made that Mr. Hutchison was ineligible to have received
public assistance during any and/or all of the period of time for
which a child support obligation is hereby imposed upon the defendant, the judgment herein will be modified accordingly.
Regarding the amount properly owed by the defendant. §78-45b-6(2)
provides:
"The administrative hearing examiner, after full
and fair hearing, conducted in accordance with
the rules and regulations of the department shall
make specific findings regarding the liability
and responsibility, if any, of the alleged
responsible parent and the amount of such
liability computable on the basis of the amount
of assistance paid or to be paid. In making
these findings, the hearing officer shall include
in his deliberations the necessities and requirements of the child, exclusive of any income of
the custodian of said child, the amount -of the
support debt claimed, the amount of assistance
paid or to be paid, the abilities and resources
of the responsible parent and the public policy
and intent of the legislature to require that
children be maintained from the resources of
responsible parents thereby relieving to the
greatest extent possible the burden upon the
general citizenry through welfare programs."
Although the defendant was not employed during the period of time
under review and. thus, had no monthly income during the five months
in question, the defendant should nevertheless be obligated to provide some reimbursement to the State of Utah for the public assistance which has been provided for the support of that child who
resided with Mr. Hutchison and for whom public assistance was
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provided.

Given her lack of employment and available monthly income,

a reasonably nominal assessment which should be imposed upon the
defendant in that regard is Twenty-five dollars ($25.00) per month,
or a total of One hundred twenty-five dollars ($125.00).
Inasmuch as it appears that public assistance will continue to
be provided for the support of one of the two children in question,
the defendant's on-going obligation to provide some reimbursement to
the State of Utah in that regard should also be computed at the rate
of Twenty-five dollars ($25.00) per month.
One further matter should be addressed.

Section 78-45b-17

provides:
"The department may consistent with the income,
earning capacity and resources of the debtor, set
or reset a level and schedule of payments to be
paid upon the debt...."
Although the child support arrearage which is owed by the defendant
represents an outstanding indebtedness which is due and owing in
full, pursuant to the just-quoted statute, the defendant may be
afforded the opportunity to commence repayment in satisfaction of
that indebtedness over an extended period of time.

Given the defen-

dant's current lack of employment and monthly income, she should not
be presently required to commence repayment in satisfaction of the
indebtedness which exists.

Further, she should not be required to

make payment in satisfaction of any on-going child support obligation
which may exist, relative to public assistance which may be provided
for the support of the one child who still lives with Mr. Hutchison.
Rather, an investigator from the Office of Recovery Services should
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periodically monitor the defendant's financial circumstances.

As

may be appropriate, the defendant should be required to attend an
assessment conference with said investigator, whereby some determination be initially made as to whatever rate of repayment would be
properly required of the defendant, relative to the eventual satisfaction of whatever child support arrearage may subsequently exist.
Dated this

November, 1983.

ORDER
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ordered, adjudged and
decreed that judgment in the sum of One hundred twenty-five dollars
($125.00) be entered against the defendant.

Said judgment represents

reimbursement properly owed to the State of Utah for public assistance which was provided to John Collins Hutchison from June 1, 1983
through October, 1983, relative to the support of either and/or both
of the defendant's dependent children, to wit:

Diana Michele and

John Collins. Jr.
It is further ordered that, so long as public assistance is
provided for the support of that child (i.e., Diana Michele) who
presently resides with Mr. Hutchison, the defendant's on-going child
support obligation in that regard shall be at the rate of Twentyfive dollars ($25.00) per month.
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It is further ordered that, pursuant to §78-45b-17. an investigator from the Office of Recovery Services shall periodically monitor
the defendant's employment and financial circumstances-

As may be

subsequently warranted, the defendant shall be required to attend an
assessment conference with said investigator, wherein a determination
shall be initially made as to whatever rate of repayment shall be
required of the defendant toward the satisfaction of the judgment
set forth herein and any unpaid child support arrearages which may
accrue in the interim.
Judicial review of these Findings and Order may be obtained by
filing a Petition and Twenty-five dollars ($25.00) with the District
Court within twenty days after receipt of the Findings and Order
herein.

Said Petition shall be served upon the Department and shall

state the grounds upon which review in this matter is sought*
Dated this <?&

day of November. 1983.

NORMAN G. ANGUS
Executive Director
(

MAILING CERTIFICATE
This is to certify that I have mailed a true and exact copy of
the foregoing Memorandum of Findings and Order to Paul D. Vernieu,
Deputy Weber County Attorney, to Recovery Services Team #12, to John
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Salt Lake County Utah

JUN 191986
H. OixonHmdtoy,Ol^c8rtOtot Court
By

OtputyCI*t

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MARSHA LEE STARKS, aka
MARSHA LEE BEACHLER,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CIVIL NO.

C-83-8696

Petitioner/Defendant,
vs.
STATE OF UTAH, Department of
Social Services,
Respondent/Plaintiff.

Before the Court is the petitioner's Petition for Review
wherein she seeks to have this Court, pursuant to Section 78-45b-6.1
of the Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended, review the Findings
and Order of the Department of Social Services for the State
of Utah.

While the matter has been on file for 6ome period

of time and brought to a head by the Courtfs Order to Show Cause
directed to the parties# requiring them to appear and show cause
why the matter should not be dismissed for failure to prosecaite
the briefs as required by the aforementioned Section have now
been filed, and the matter is ready for decision*
Upon reviewing the matters in the Courtfs official file,
the Petition, the transcript of evidence taken before the Administrative Law Judge, the Findings, Conclusions and Order entered
by the Administrative Law Judge, as well as the Memorandum of
Points and Authorities submitted by both the petitioner and

STARKS V. STATE

PAGE TWO

MEMORANDUM DECISION

the respondent, the Court finds that the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and the Order as entered by the Department
of Social Services through its Administrative Law Judge are
supported by the facts, well-founded in the law, and should
otherwise be affirmed.
Therefore, the Court affirms the Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law, and the Order entered by the Administrative Law Judge
for the Department of Social Services, and denies the Petition
of the petitioner Marsha Lee Starks wherein she seeks to be
relieved of the obligations imposed on her by the Administrative
Order.
Counsel for the Department of Social Services is to prepare
an appropriate Order in accordance with this Memorandum Decision,
and submit the same to the Court for signature and review in
accordance with the Local Rules of Practice.
Dated this

//

day of June, 1986.

TIMOTHY R. HANSON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that 4 copies of the foregoing Brief was
served to Blaine Ferguson, Assistant Attorney General, 236
State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, by mailing said
Brief by first-class mail, postage prepaid, or by
hand-delivering said copies this
1987.

llb/beachler.bri

day of
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